Michigan Law Review [Vol. 9(U 363 have used history to illustrate the long American tradition of mutual support and cooperation between religion and govemmenr.s Others have used history to demonstrate the long American tradition of privileging certain religious traditions and vilifying others,' The Supreme Court has sought to paper over these antinomies with mechanical tests like the Lemon test of establishment' and the compelling state interest test of free exercise," but these have proved unpersuasive in theory and unworkable in practice, Justices have readily departed from them in individual cases, or criticized them in angry separate opinions.'? Arlin Adams and Charles Emmerich's A Nation Dedicated to Religious Liberty II charts a bold course between these antinomies in pursuit of a more integrated understanding of religious liberty. In ninety-
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Exception.al parochlel school students may receive counseling, but it must take place outside of the parocbial school. such as in a trailer parked down the street. A State may Jive cash to a parochial school to pay for the administration of Slate-written tC5U and state-<lrd~reo porting services. but it may not provide funds for teacher-prepared tests on secular subjeCtS. Religious instruction may not be given in public school. but the public school may release students during the day for religion classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at thOle cla.sses with its truancy laws. Wallace v. Jalfree. 472 U. S. 38. 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist. J .• dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted).
11. Arlin M. Adams is a former distinguished judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third CirCUlt. Charles J Emmench IS fonner directOr of the Center of Church·State Studies at
• .~ 'Y 1992] Religious Liberty 1365 six pages of tightly written text, they present a provocative new readingof the history of the religion clauses that integrates the diversity of perspectives among the Founders and later interpreters. They offer an arresting new First Amendment paradigm in which the values of interpretivism and noninterpretivism, separation ism and accommodationism, disestablishment and free exercise all find a place. The book is not entirely new and does not purport to be. It echoes tbe themes of several of Judge Adams' judicial opinions'? and scholarly articles" of the past decade. It draws heavily on a long tradition of careful historiography begun by Chester Antieau, Mark Howe, and Paul Kauper in the 19605 and carried forward today by scores of able writers." Specialists will search the book in vain for new archival discoveries or new deconstructions of Supreme Court opinions. Neophytes will look in frustration for any respite from the brisk pace of the prose and the analysis. Liberals will look askance on the unabashed conservativism of some of the passages. But no one who reads the book will come away empty.
In this essay, I offer an analytical summary of the volume and then 
I
Adams and Emmerich delicately balance interpretivism and noninterpretivism in their investigation of the First Amendment religion clauses." Neither form of constitutional interpretation, they believe, does justice to the historical sources or current controversies, and neither deals adequately with the doctrines of precedent and tradition (pp. 19-20, 32-36, 74-75, 94-95 The authors trace the "underlying philosophy" of the religion clauses to sundry European and colonial sources. Continental Protestant theology, English Lockean philosophy, and colonial Free Church experiences all helped to forge the American tradition of religious liberty. Calvinists and Lutherans advocated both the institutional separation of church and state and the cultivation of a strong public morality and discipline through legal measures. Such ideas came to robust expression in Puritan New England.'< English Lockean and radical writers taught liberty of conscience and the toleration of a plurality of religions. Such ideas found ready acceptance among the enlightened intelligentsia of the Carolinas and the Middle colonies (pp. 3-4, 8,44 The Founders took these and other views into account in their formation of constitutional provisions and legislative policies on religion and the church. A wide "spectrum of ideas" concerning religion and government prevailed during the founding era (p. 31). Adams and Emmerich warn that "[ajny attempt to reduce the Founders' views to one position" or to restrict the inquiry to Virginian and congressional records, as some cases and commentaries have done, "is apt to produce indefensible and culturally unacceptable results" (pp. 22-31). The authors divide the spectrum of Founders' views on religion and government into three positions -pietistic separationism; Enlightenment separationism, and political centrism. These positions are not hardened paradigms or Weberian ideal. types but simply "heuristic" categories that help to describe the spectrum of ideas among the Founders (pp. 19, 31, [33] [34] [35] [36] • property and impose clerical discipline: Enlightenment separationists also believed in a limited, neutral government that would give no special protection or privilege to religion and would predicate none of its laws or policies directly on religious arguments (pp. 22-26). Political centrists like George Washington and John Adams stood between these two separationist positions. Like the other two groups, the political centrists advocated liberty of conscience for all, and they opposed both religious intrusions on politics that rose to the level of political theocracy and political intrusions on religion that rose to the level of religious establishment. Unlike the other groups, however, they "believed that religion was an essential cornerstone for morality, civic virtue, and democratic government" (p. 26), without which society would succumb to man's inherently sinful tendencies. " [W] e have no government," wrote John Adams, "armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion."20 The political centrists thus supported governmental proclamations of Thanksgiving Day prayers and appointment of chaplains, governmental sponsorship of general religious education and organization, and governmental enforcement of a stern religiously based morality through positive law (pp. 26-28, 51-52, 113-14) .
Adams and Emmerich are largely content to juxtapose these three sets of Founders' views and pay little attention to their relative priority or relative constitutional influence. Later in the volume, they allow that the political centrists "predominated among the Founders" (p. 51) and that "[tjhe religion clauses owe as much, if not more, to the pietistic and political centrist positions as to the Enlightenment" (p. 95). They also seem to prefer the pietists over the others, if frequency of citation is any indication. But the authors' main -and novelpoint is that the Founders' "broad purposes" respecting government and religion cannot be sought in anyone of these philosophies, but only in the dialectic among all three of them. Such a dialectic produced a consensus among the Founders on the "core value" of religious liberty and a range of "animating principles" designed for its integration and implementation.
The Founders all agreed that religious liberty was a "core value" and "first liberty" -"the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights," as Jefferson put it. This core value of religious liberty imbued both state and federal constitutional provisions on religion. All eleven of the state constitutions ratified between 1776 and 1784 included general guarantees of religious liberty, often accompanied by elaborate panegyrics about its importance and elaborate principles for its implementation (pp. 38-39, 115-20) . Likewise, the drafters of the First Amendment embraced religious liberty as their common goal, and "intended the establishment and free exercise clauses to be [its] complementary co-guarantors" (p. 37). The drafters did not prefer one religion clause over the other or perceive any tension between them. Their goal was simply to prevent Congress from intruding on religious liberty, by either prescribing ("respecting an establishment") or proscribing ("prohibiting") anyone form of religious belief, action, or organization." "[Hlistory supports the view," the authors insist, "that the nonestablishment and free exercise guarantees, play different although mutually supportive, roles in protecting religious liberty" (p. 43).
The religion clauses of the First Amendment were neither self-contained nor self-implementing. Four "animating principles" -federalism, separationism, accommodationism, and neutrality -served to integrate and implement these twin guarantees (pp. 72-73). These historical principles, the authors argue, are embedded in the Constitution, and can be discerned in the "colonial and early national antecedents on religious freedom, the legislative history of the [religion] clauses, and the Founders' beliefs and practices" (p. 94). Though each group of Founders clearly favored certain animating principles over others, they recognized that all four of these principles were indispensable to the protection of religious liberty. The principle of federalism bolstered the guarantees of both religion clauses (pp. 43-51, 72) . It prevented the federal government ("Congress") from establishing a single national church, as prevailed in England and France; it also perpetuated diversity of religious confession and control within the states. The Founders believed "that au- thority over religion, to the extent it could be exercised, was a state matter; and that, unless prevented, Congress would pose a dangerous threat to religious liberty" (p. 44; footnote omitted). The principle of federalism reflected both of these beliefs. The authors rather loosely subsume within federalism the principle of social or structural plural. ism." "In addition to dividing state and federal authority," they argue, "the Founders sought to ensure a free society by affording constitutional protection, at both levels, to 'mediating' institutions such as the family, churches, the press, business, and voluntary associations" (p. 47). Such institutions not only provided "buffers between the individual and the government" (p. 47), but represented different interests and articulated alternative perspectives in the public square.
The principle of institutional separation of church and state also animated both religion clauses (pp. 51-58). It precluded alliances that resulted in state coercion of religious beliefs and state intrusions on religious organizations, as was common in establishment regimes. It also ensured that free exercise rights attached to both individual believers and religious institutions. In its original formulation, the principle of separation of church and state mandated neither the separation of religion and politics nor the secularization of civil society. The Founders did not intend to preclude religious officials from participating in political and public affairs or religious beliefs from leavening public discourse and opinion. "[Tjhe founders conceived of separation in institutional rather than cultural terms .... that religion and society should be separated was a notion that would have met with uniform disapproval" (p. 51).
The principle of accommodation rendered the protections of the Free Exercise Clause accessible to all religious believers (pp. 58-65). The Founders understood that religion assumed a plurality of forms and that, in a democratic society, religious minorities would sometimes stand conscientiously opposed to the policies of religious and political majorities. The principle of accommodation required officials to balance "government's duty to promote the cohesiveness necessary for an ordered society and its responsibility to honor the religious practices of citizens by refraining from unnecessary or burdensome regulation.T" The Founders memorialized this principle not only in 24. I say "rather loosely" because the authors' discussion of structural pluralism in this section is. in contrast to most of the book. devoid of close citations to the historical sources. pp. 61-64) . The principle of benevolent neutrality required government to treat all religious groups equally and avoid favoritism of some and discnmination against others (pp. 65-72). Such equality of treatment would ensure that individuals could choose their religion voluntarily. In its original formulation. the principle of benevolent neutrality did not prohibit government from offering general nonpreferential aid to religion. nor did it require government to treat religious beliefs and actions on a par with those that were nonreligious. According to the Founders, "[tjhe religion clauses do not compel a neutrality that is blind to the spiritual needs of citizens. Instead, they promote religious liberty through a benevolent neutrality that permits government to foster a society committed to voluntary religious belief and practice" (p. 73).
The Founders designed these four animating principles to be mutually supportive and mutually subservient to the higher goal of religious liberty." No single principle could by itself guarantee religious liberty. Pure federalism could readily perpetuate repressive religious establishments. as it had done in the colonies and in early modem Europe.21 Pure separationism could deprive the church of all meaningful forms and functions, as it would do in the Soviet Union." Pure accommodationism could deprive society of all common values and beliefs and the state of any neutral role (pp. 58-59). Pure neutrality could render government blindly indifferent to the special place of religion in the community and in the Constitution (p. 71). As a consequence, the Founders integrated these four principles, and made each of them "a servant of an even greater goal," a "means ... to achieve the ideal of religious liberty in a free society" (p. 37).
In the past half century, the authors argue, these four principles have become alienated both from each other and from themselves. Courts and commentators have sought to achieve religious liberty on the basis of a single principle and so have variously equated religious In response to this crisis, the authors call courts and commentators back to the core value of religious liberty and its animating principles. This is not simply a call to a romantic past, or an invitation to transpose 200-year-old theories and laws into our culture. The authors are aware that the historical sources on religious liberty are more than a little Delphic and that current religious liberty issues require adaptation and extension even of those historical prescriptions that can be discerned (p. 75). They also know that the doctrine of precedent mandates that any transformation of First Amendment law be gradual and deliberate.
Thus their agenda is modest and realistic. "[Cjourts should look to the basic value of religious liberty and its implementing principles," they argue, not "as a test or formula to be applied woodenly to current issues," but as a guide to "the revision of existing tests or the formulation of new ones" (p. 74). Such an agenda will ultimately yield a more integrative law of religious liberty."
The authors use, among other issues, the controversy over the "equal access" of religious students to public school fora to demonstrate the utility of the their integrative approach."
Traditionally, religious students have claimed a free exercise right to use public school facilities after school hours to hold their voluntary meetings alongside those of other nonreligious groups. Courts have held that the Establishment Clause denies them access to these facilities, since religion is a private matter whose inclusion in the public school forum would suggest an official endorsement of religion. This, to the authors, is a false dilemma: "Properly framed, the issue becomes whether equal access for student religious groups advances religious liberty ... [and] whether the selective exclusion of such groups violates this value" (p. 79). Consideration of the four animating principles compels their conclusion that "religious liberty not only would seem to permit but would require equal access for student religious groups". (p. 79). Federalism encourages government to hear a plurality of voices. particularly religious voices, in mediating structures like the school. [Vol. 90, I 363 Separationism and accommodationism teach that state facilitation of voluntary. non coerced religious activity is not only countenanced by the Establishment Clause but commanded by the Free Exercise Clause. Neutrality prohibits the state from singling out religious groups for special prohibition. Religious student groups that voluntarily convene must, therefore, receive equal access to the public school forum.?"
• II
A Nation Dedicated to Religious Liberty is lucid and learned in argument. lean and laconic in style. It is well documented and indexed and largely up to date with the burgeoning literature on this vast subject. Graced with a foreword by Warren Burger and a handsome selection of historical documents, it serves as a provocative primer for the uninitiated reader and a pristine restatement for the specialist. A few lapses and lacunae in the presentation merit comment, however, particularly since the book is advertised as a prospectus of the authors' 
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• and ecclesiastical power in this world. The church. according to Calvin. wields not only spiritual authority over doctrine and liturgy, but also temporal authority over ecclesiastical polity and property and over the discipline and pedagogy of its members.'" This theological distinction had profound political consequences: Lutheran churches in Germany and Scandinavia remained subject to close magisterial authority over their temporalities until well into the nineteenth century; Calvinist churches, by contrast, developed elaborate ecclesiastical polities, whose spiritual and temporal authority they jealously protected against civil intrusion." In the same vein, the authors assert that the Puritans of colonial New England confiated the institutions of church and state and "rejected the concept of ecclesiastical courts.""
In fact, the New England Puritans, like their European Calvinist brethren, separated the institutions of church and state, and the churches developed ecclesiastical courts to discharge their spiritual and temporal authority." The authors assert that the religion clauses of the First Amendment are "one of America's great contributions to Western civilization" (p. I). By 1789, however, several European polities had already promulgated disestablishment and free exercise provisions, which were equally, if • [Vol. 9(} I }6)
•
• not more, influential in the West.'" The authors cite the 1649 Maryland Act Concerning Religion as "the first law in America to afford a measure of religious freedom" (p. 5). More than a decade before, however, the Providence Plantation had promulgated strong religious liberty provisions, which proved more effective than the ill-fated Maryland Act" The authors refer rather casually to the Lockean character of American revolutionary and republican thought (pp. 3-4, 8,44, 127) . But recent historical writing has exposed a welter of other ideological and institutional sources of early American thought besides Locke's writings.... Second, the classification of the Founders' views on religion and government, though far more candid with and faithful to the archives than traditional descriptions, is still a bit rough-hewn. The authors do describe the pietistic, enlightenment, and political centrist positions of the Founders as merely "heuristic" (p. 31). They also recognize the diversity of views within each class and warn against too close an adherence to their terminology (pp. 22, 31). But, even taking these caveats into account, some peculiarities in the presentation remain.
A few of the Founders seem misclassified. Roger Sherman, for example, is classified as a pietist (pp. 30-31). Though Sherman clearly sympathized with the New Lights of Connecticut, his stern Puritan bearing, his habitual stress on the legal enforcement of Christian morals, and his strong ties with the congregationalist establishment render him more centrist than pietist." The same is true of John 44. Amooa the fint such provisions were those produced during the later sixtcenth-century Revolt of the Netherlands. particularly The Pacification of Ghent (1576) • [Vol. 9(),\ J6J
• preachers of the later eighteenth century" A full understanding of pietistic separationism requires a more nuanced treatment of these later writings and a closer delineation of their views. The class of "political centrists" is too generic in definition and eclectic in participation. The authors assign the centrists to a point along the spectrum from pietistic to Enlightenment separationism. But several Founders did not fit anywhere on this ideological spectrum. The authors reduce the core teaching of the centrists to Washington's maxim that religion and morality are essential to good government, a view that hardly distinguishes the centrists from either the Enlightenment or the pietistic separationists. The authors focus on the "political" formulations of the centrists, but the philosophical and popular expressions of "centrism" were probably more illustrative and influential. The authors label as centrists spokesmen as diverse as the Catholic Carrolls of Maryland and the Puritan Adamses of Massachusetts, who had rather different ideas about religion and government.
The Founders outside the pietist and Enlightenment camps who spoke to the issue of religious liberty fell into at least three additional classes, besides that of "political centrism." One group consisted of New England Puritans, who the authors say "provided the moral and religious background of fully 75 percent of the people who declared their independence in 1776."" Their distinctive theology of the covenant community, social pluralism, natural freedom, and church-state relations was not suddenly subsumed within political centrism after the revolution. It was forcefully argued by Charles Chauncy, Jonathan Edwards, Jonathan Mayhew, and a host of sermonizers and pamphleteers inspired by their views.,. Their writings had a powerful influence on the early constitutional tradition of the New England states and on the thought of such politicians as John Adams, Fisher Ames, and Oliver Ellsworth. A second group -the so-called "civic republicans" -sought the reformation of social morals, the cultivation of public spiritedness, and the articulation of a common set of beliefs for the new nation. Represented by Samuel Adams, James Wil- The authors' integrative theory of religious liberty is both their most original and most controversial contribution. Such a theory is particularly propitious given the widespread new interest in the history of religious liberty and the widespread frustration with current First Amendment doctrine. Neither the historical cogency nor the current utility of this theory, however, are entirely proven in this brief book -though such proof may well be forthcoming in their two-volume work-in-progress.
Certain parts of the theory stand on solid and high ground: the identification of religious liberty as a universally accepted core value in the founding era, the basic descriptions of the principles of institutional separation of church and state and of noncoercion and equal treatment of religion, the argument that the First Amendment religion clauses were binding on the federal government ("Congress") alone and that state governments were free to govern religion and the church in accordance with their own state constitutions, and the application of this integrated theory to the modem controversies over equal access and religious symbolism are all unassailable and wholly convincing. Other parts of this integrative theory, however, are less c0-gently argued.
The discussions of accommodationism and benevolent neutrality are modernist in tone and only modestly supported by the sources. These two terms and concepts are of recent vintage. Accommodationism is usually associated with a pro-religious reading of the Free Exercise Clause, benevolent neutrality with a pro-religious reading of the Establishment Clause." Neither term appears in the writings of the Founders whom the authors quote, and neither concept (as currently formulated) appears directly in the historical sources that the authors adduce (pp. S8-71 • Winthrop's robust "covenantal" or "federal" (from the Latin term /oedus) theory of family. church, and civic community remained a vital part of Amencan Puritan thought.s-By the late eighteenth century, however, the leading American constitutional Framers used federalism in a much narrower political sense to describe the relationship between the extant state governments and the new national government. This was a "novel, unprecedented concept of federalism"" that moved the Founders beyond traditional Western concepts of both confederation and consociation."
Although a few late eighteenth-century discussions of federalism dithered on this point, it is hard to squeeze a theory of social pluralism out of them.
Pluralism was not a species of federalism, but an independent and indispensable "animating principle" of religious liberty in the founding era. The Founders recognized two distinct types of pluralism: (1) social pluralism, or the division of society into associations like families, churches, schools, corporations, and clubs; and (2) confessional pluralism, or the development of various patterns of individual and institutional expressions of religion.
The principle of social pluralism found its strongest supporters among the "political centrists" and Puritans. Such diverse social institutions, the Puritans and centrists argued, had several redeeming qual. ities. They provided multiple fora for religious expressions and actions, important sources of morality, charity, and discipline in the community, and important bulwarks against state encroachment on natural liberties, particularly religious liberty." As John Adams put it:
My Opinion of the Duties of Religion and Morality comprehends a very extensive connection with society at large, and the great Interest of the public. Does not natural Morality, and much more Christian Benevolence. make it our indispensable Duty to lay ourselves out, to serve our fellow Creatures to the Utmost of our Power, in promoting and support--;
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